Abstract-In transportation network research, the main approach for predicting traffic distribution due to noncooperative vehicle choices has been through fluid type models. The basic model considers a continuum of infinitesimal "non-atomic" vehicles, each seeking the shortest path to its destination. The resulting equilibrium turns out to be much simpler to characterize in comparison to the finite-vehicle case, yet provides a good approximation to the latter. A less familiar fluid-type model uses a continuum limit for the network topology. The limit network is a continuum plane which inherits its cost structure from the original network, and the corresponding equilibrium is identified as the continuum traffic equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies a distributed load balancing problem in the presence of a large number of resources. We consider two processors connected through a fast bus of some fixed length, which also connects the two processors to a large number of resources. Each processor divides a given workload (or "flow") between all available resources in order to minimize its operation cost, which consists of the delay incurred by sending flow over the network (proportional to the distance of the resource from the processor and/or to the number of hops the flow traverses), and the processing time at the resource itself. Motivating examples are multi-processor systems, in which each processor determines whether a task should be processed locally or scheduled to a different node for remote processing (see, e.g., [12] ). Other examples include novel communication link architectures that connect between processor nodes to input-output nodes, such as storage devices (e.g., InfiniBand [9] ).
When each processor applies load balancing to minimize its own cost, a noncooperative game situation arises, analogous to interactions in network routing games with congestion costs (see [11] and references therein). While network routing games have been analyzed extensively, noncooperative load balancing has received less attention. The existing work in the latter area mostly focuses on models in which users are restricted to use only two resources, and where delay costs are locationindependent (see [8] and references therein). A common challenge in the analysis of the problem is dealing with the complexity involved in characterizing the load balancing (Nash) equilibria.
In this paper, we consider load balancing in a dense network and show that when it is approximated by its continuum limit (i.e., there is a continuum of resources), a tight characterization of Nash equilibria becomes possible. In particular, we show how to calculate the equilibrium point, and derive closed-form solutions for special cost structures. We also establish bounds on the inefficiency of the equilibria (i.e., "price of anarchy" [11] ) for this class of load-balancing games. Related Literature. The continuum topology paradigm has been introduced into telecommunications networks with the pioneering paper of Jacquet [6] . Based on this continuum approximation, methods that employ electrostatics tools were exploited for studying other variants of the routing problem (see [5] , [13] and references therein). The above methodologies emerged independently of the existing theory of road-traffic engineering. Already in 1952, Wardrop [14] and Beckmann [3] have introduced the continuum topology approximation in a competitive routing context, where not only the network becomes a continuum, but also the vehicles are represented as a continuum population of decision makers. This way of modeling competition in routing games has been an active research area among that community, see [4] and references therein. Building upon these tools, recent papers study the equilibria in ad-hoc networks (see, e.g., [1] ). Contribution and Paper Structure. In the present paper we introduce the continuum topology approach to study the equilibrium properties in load balancing scenarios. We consider a noncooperative game restricted to two players (in contrast to the infinite player formalism of road traffic), where each player controls a splittable flow (that may represent a large number of packets or jobs). In a full version of this work [2] , we show that the continuum approximation is the limit of the discrete resource case, thereby justifying the use of the approximation.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The network model is presented in Section II. Basic equilibrium properties are summarized in Section III. We then concentrate on the This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2009 proceedings. case of identical resources where connection costs are linear with distance. In Section IV we show how to calculate the equilibrium point for that case. In Sections V-VI we restrict attention to resources with polynomial congestion costs, which allow for explicit characterization of the equilibrium point, and quantification of the efficiency loss. Conclusions are highlighted in Section VII. The bulk of the proofs for this work are omitted here due to lack of space, and can be found in [2] .
II. THE MODEL
We consider two processors (or users) that are connected through a link of length L. The same link also connects the two processors to additional resources. The flow demand of the processors is assumed fixed, and is given by r i , i = 1, 2. Each processor divides its flow between the available resources in order to minimize its cost, which is defined below.
The cost for shipping a unit of flow through a given resource consists of two elements (i) a connection cost, which is proportional to the distance from the processor to the resource; (ii) a congestion cost, which depends on the total flow handled by the resource. Each resource is modeled as a link, and is identified, without loss of generality, by its distance from processor-1 (see Figure 1) . That is, link x is located x lengthunits from processor-1 and L−x length units from processor-2. Let u i (x) denote the flow that processor-i (i = 1, 2) sends to link x; further denote by u(x) = u 1 (x) + u 2 (x) the total flow at that link. The per-unit connection cost to link x is given by the function f i (x) (note that this cost is user-dependent). The congestion cost per unit flow at link x is given by the function
. In this paper we study the continuum noncooperative game that corresponds to the above model. In the continuum case it is assumed that there exists a resource at every x ∈ [0, L]. Consequently, user strategies are given by functions
User costs are given by
For now, we assume that the integrals in (1) and (2) exist, and justify this assumption later in Section IV. We refer to the game between the two processors as the load balancing game. Let u i denote the strategy of user i. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the load balancing game is a joint flow allocation (u 1 , u 2 ) which is feasible for both processors and satisfies the following condition:
for any feasible flow allocationsũ i , i = 1, 2. Throughout the paper we assume that the functions f i (x) and g x (u(x)) satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 1: The function f i (x) is continuous in x and strictly increasing with the distance from the processor to the resource for i = 1, 2, i.e., f 1 (x) is strictly increasing in x while f 2 (x) is strictly decreasing in x. Assumption 2: The function g x (u) is positive, continuous, strictly increasing and convex in u, with g x (0) = 0.
III. BASIC EQUILIBRIUM PROPERTIES
We start our analysis of the load balancing game by providing a basic characterization result for the Nash equilibrium point, using the first-order optimality conditions for the individual optimization problem of the players (given the equilibrium strategy of the other player). In view of the separable structure of this optimization problem, the optimality conditions decouple over each
Lemma 1: Let u = (u 1 , u 2 ) be a NE of the load balancing game. Then, for all i = 1, 2, there exists a scalar λ i > 0 such that the following conditions hold for all x ∈ [0, L] with probability one:
where g x (u(x)) denotes a subgradient of g x at u(x). The optimality conditions (4) would serve in subsequent sections as a main building block for characterizing the Nash equilibria of the load balancing game. An immediate result due to these conditions is the uniqueness of the equilibrium point, which essentially follows from the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for (finite) parallel-link networks, obtained in [10] . A precise statement and proof of this property can be found in the full version of this work [2] .
From a game-theoretic perspective, the infinite-dimensional action space of each user requires special care with regard to the existence of an equilibrium point. In [2] , we establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. In the current paper, we advocate a direct approach, by explicitly characterizing the equilibrium point for a given cost-structure (see Section V), hence establishing its existence.
IV. LINEAR CONNECTION COSTS
We henceforth consider the case where the connection cost is linearly proportional to the distance the flow traverses from the processor to the resource. More precisely, f
, where α > 0 is the connection cost per length-unit for shipping a unit of flow (the engineering motivation for exploring this linear cost model is discussed in [2] ). The resources are assumed to be identical in terms of their available resources and associated costs. Hence, a unified function g = g x , x ∈ [0, L] (which obeys Assumption 2) will be used for the congestion cost. In addition, we assume that many resources are available, hence approximate this scenario by assuming a continuum of resources.
Throughout the paper, we denote by x 1 the farthest location (relative to processor-1 origin) at which processor-1 stops transmitting alone. Similarly, x 2 denotes the farthest location (relative to processor-2 origin) at which processor-2 stops transmitting alone.
A. Basic Properties
We establish below an important equilibrium property for linear connection costs: the total flow at every link in which both processors transmit is the same; it does not depend on x. It is easy to verify that the region in which both processors transmit is a compact subset in [0, L]. Based on the above lemma, we may derive the flow of each processor at the commonly shred links as a function of x 1 and x 2 .
Lemma 3: Assume that the subset of links in which both users transmit is not empty. Then,
and similarly u
. We note that the above two lemmas do not require the continuum approximation, i.e., the same results hold in the finitelink case. However, it is hard to exploit them for the latter case, as we demonstrate in [2] . Two important observation that are based on Lemma 3 are in place: First, the flow of each processor in the commonly shared region varies linearly, regardless of the structure of the congestion cost g. Second, in order to calculate the flow of each processor in every x of the commonly shared region, we require the locations x 1 , x 2 , the flows at these two locations and the total flow in each point u.
For the analysis of the equilibrium point, we distinguish between three different scenarios of traffic load: (i) Light load (Section IV-B), where the traffic of the two processors does not overlap; (ii) Medium load (Section IV-C), where the processors overlap on a subset of links; (iii) Heavy load (Section IV-D), where both processors use all links.
B. Light Load Conditions
The KKT optimality conditions for this setup are as in (4), except that u(x) is replaced everywhere by u i (x). Consequently, we obtain the following equation:
where
The function h(u(x)) is a continuous increasing function by Assumption 2. Consequently, its inverse h −1 is a well-defined increasing function. Hence,
Note that x i for the light-load case stands for the location at which processor-i stops transmitting. It can be easily shown that the flow at the locations x i equals to zero. Based on this fact, it follows that λ 1 = αx 1 and λ 2 = α(L − x 2 ). Thus,
The quantities x 1 , x 2 can be calculated by using the feasibility constraint (1). Using (8), the following equation is valid for processor-1
similarly,
L x2
h −1 (αx − αx 2 )dx = r 2 for processor-2. Based on the these equations, explicit flow equations can be obtained for specific cost functions, as we exemplify in Section V.
C. Medium Load Conditions
There are two different scenarios for partial overlap between the flows of the two processors: (i) Each of the two processors uses a subset of links (see Fig. 3 ); (ii) One of the two processors uses a subset of links, whereas the other processor uses all links (see Fig. 4 ). We focus here on the former case, whereas the analysis of the latter can be found in [2] .
Assuming that both processors use a subset of links, the unknown variables, which are needed in order to characterize the equilibrium point, are x 1 , x 2 andū. These variables may be obtained through a set of three equations, as we specify below. The first equation compares the marginal cost of one of the processors (say processor-1) at points x 1 and x 2 . The marginal costs at these two points are equal since both processors transmit at these points. We assert that the flow of processor-1 at x 2 is zero, and so is the flow of processor-2 at x 1 (see [2] ). Consequently, we obtain the following equation:
The next equations incorporate the total flow constraint of each processor. Note that
. In addition, the flow distribution of each processor includes a subregion in which it submits alone and a commonly shared subregion. Using Lemma 2 and the analysis for the light network conditions (Section IV-B), and further noting that both processors submit the same amount of flow in the commonly shared region, we obtain the following equations:
D. Heavy Load Conditions
In the heavily loaded network setup, both processors use all links. Lemma 2 and the total flow constraint (1) immediately lead to quantifying the total flow at each link:
Proposition 1: Assume the network is heavily loaded. Then the total flow at every link is given byū = r1+r2 L . Based on Proposition 1 and Lemma 3, simple algebra leads to explicit characterization of the flow of the two processors at each link.
Proposition 2: Consider heavy load conditions. The flows of the processors at every link x are given by
We note that the equilibrium that has been characterized for the different load conditions is continuous in each user's policy u i , hence justifying the integrability assumption in (1)-(2).
V. POLYNOMIAL CONGESTION COSTS
Let g(u) = cu β , where c > 0. In this case, the function h (defined in (7)) is equivalent to h(u) = cu β (1 + β); its inverse is given by
where γ c = c
β . We first focus on extreme load conditions (light/heavy) and obtain explicit flow equations. For medium load conditions, we assume that the processor demands are equal. Using this symmetry, we are able to fully characterize the equilibrium for linear latency functions. 
The solution is "separable" (i.e., user flows do not interact), hence it forms an equilibrium (see [2] for a formal proof of this property). Having found x 1 and x 2 , the flow of every user at each point can be obtained by (9) and (14). Heavy Load. The flows at every point x are immediately obtained through Proposition 1 and replacing g (u) = cβu
in (13). Medium Load. Assume that r 1 = r 2 = r. By symmetry, we are left with two variables x 0 andū, where
Using the latter equation and (12) we obtain in [2] a single scalar equation which can be solved numerically for general β. For β = 1, an explicit solution is given by
The second variableū is then obtained by substituting (17) in (16). These two variables are sufficient for finding the processor flows at any x. Equilibrium characterization. To conclude the characterization of the Nash equilibrium under symmetric demands and linear congestion costs, we next obtain explicit conditions for belonging to each of the load scenarios: The condition for light load (15) becomes r ≤ 1 16c αL 2 . Substituting x 0 = 0 in (17) gives us the highest value of r for which the network is under medium load conditions. We obtain the following condition 
VI. EFFICIENCY LOSS
In this section we briefly examine through a specific cost structure the extent to which selfish behavior affects system performance. That it, we are interested to compare the quality of the obtained equilibrium point to the centralized, systemoptimal solution. We restrict ourselves to linear connection and congestion costs, i.e., f
It has been established in [7] that the (unique) equilibrium point coincides with the social optimum for the case where there are no connection costs. We next show that the incorporation of connections costs may result in some efficiency loss, despite the linearity of both connection and congestion costs. We are able to upper-bound this efficiency loss by deriving the so-called price-of-anarchy (PoA) [11] of our network.
Naturally, we study the PoA under heavy-load conditions assumption (a justification can be found in [2] ). We further assume that both processors have an identical demand r. We characterize below both the equilibrium and optimal costs as a function of the parameters (α, c, r), and then derive the efficiency loss ratio. Equilibrium Cost. Recalling that the total flow in each link is identical and given by 2r L , the total cost of user 1 is given by
. Consequently, the total cost at equilibrium is given by JE(α, c, r 
. Optimal Cost. The basic property that allows us to derive the optimal cost is that under heavy load conditions, an optimal cost is obtained when each user sends flow to links up to distance of L/2. A proof of this property can be found in [2] . We next obtain the optimal cost for one of the users, and omit user indices for simplicity of exposition. Using (8),
2c . Hence, we may write the total flow constraint as follows:
The last equation allows us to obtain λ. Indeed, the equation is equivalent to
. Hence, the total optimal cost is given by JO(α, c, r) = 2J(u) =
. Price of Anarchy. Based on the above expressions for the equilibrium and optimal costs, we are now ready to compute the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst possible performance ratio between the two costs (i.e., supremum of the ratio
JE(α,c,r)
JO (α,c,r) ). Normalizing L to one and multiplying both JE and JO by c we obtain the following expression
where the constraint above follows from being under heavy load conditions. Define y = . The (unique) extremum point of this objective function is obtained at y = 0.7015 with a value of 1.0818, which is higher than the values obtained at y = 0.5 and y → ∞. Hence, the PoA is exactly 1.0818.
VII. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a continuum approximation of the topology in the context of networks routing games, which arise, e.g., in load balancing scenarios. The advantage of using this approximation in cases where the number of resources is large is threefold: (i) the complexity of the solution becomes independent of the number of resources (or links), (ii) explicit closed form expressions can be obtained for the equilibrium value and strategies. (iii) the continuum equilibrium is the limit of the discrete case as the number of resources goes to infinity, hence it is legitimate to use the approximation to obtain structural equilibrium properties (analogous to fluid limits in queuing networks). An immediate challenging direction for future work is to examine more complex cost structures and network topologies.
Most of the research that has investigated efficiency loss in networks considers single-class costs, meaning that all users obtain identical per-bit costs for shipping flow at a given link. This property is no longer valid in our case, due to heterogenous per-link connection costs. Multi-class models, as our model, may be more common at higher networking-levels, where users usually have diverse utilities and are thus much harder to analyze. Our explicit bound on the PoA was derived due to the continuum of links approximation. This result further emphasizes the potential of applying the approximation to additional multi-class network domains.
